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"How Do Political and Governance Institutions Affect Private 
Investment Decisions? 





This paper shows for a panel of 32 developing countries that political and governance 
institutions matter for private investment decision. This linkage is empirically verified for 
a broad number of institutions. This is the case for corruption, quality of bureaucracy, 
judiciary, security of property rights, regulations and taxation, political stability, as well 
as political rights and civil liberties. This result is obtained by estimating a simultaneous 
model of private investment and political and governance quality, where economic policy 
and other variables explain concurrently both variables. In MENA, the deficiencies in the 
administration quality, the political instability and the low public accountability 
contributed significantly to the low investment decisions of the 1980s and the 1990s. This 
paper shows as well that, although political and governance institutions constitute first 
order importance for private investment, economic reforms in the form of financial 
development and trade openness, and human capital affect private investment decision 
directly, as well as by enhancing the quality of political and governance institutions.  
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1. Introduction 
  The quality of political and governance institutions is part of the investment 
climate of a country. Because of the forward- looking nature of investment, entrepreneurs 
need a stable and secure environment to invest. ”Good” political and governance 
institutions are viewed as reducing economic uncertainties and as promoting efficiency 
(see North, 1981). In this respect, and as reported by the World Bank (2004), better 
political and governance  institutions improves the investment climate by enhancing 
bureaucratic performances and predictability. This also reduces the cost of doing 
business. Better governance contributes as well to the effective delivery of public goods 
that are necessary for productive business. Cross-country correlations using broad proxies 




In the MENA region, political and governance institutions have on average been 
weak. These weaknesses are particularly related to  democratic institutions such as 
political rights, civil liberties, or freedom of the press. Similarly,  the quality of the 
administration -- such as the control over corruption, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
reliability of the judiciary, the security of property rights or the degree of regulation and 
taxation -- are also lacking. These deficiencies have been reported as being responsible 
for the slow economic activity in MENA (see El Badawi, 2002; and the World Bank, 
2004). At the same time, private investment decisions have shown a stagnant trend. 
Although liberalization of economies and acceleration of reforms increased private 
investment throughout the world, MENA countries did not follow this movement. This 
has been the case for the last two decades (see Aysan et al. 2006).  
  The growing literature on the importance of political and governance institutions 
for economic performance has, however, recently led to reconsideration of the role of 
economic policies in explaining cross-country economic achievements. Recent work on 
the role of both governance and economic policies has found that governance institutions 
are the dominant factor with little, if any, independent influence of policies
2. These 
                                                 
1 The World Bank (2004) has investigated the correlation between private investment and the ICRG (1999) 
index of “investment profile”. This index is based on measures of contract enforceability, expropriation, 
profit repatriation, risk of operation, taxation and payment delays.  
2 See in particular Rodrik, Subramanina and Trebbi (2002), and Easterly and Levine (2003).    3
results, however, are likely to stem from endogeneity and specification problems (see 
Sachs, 2003). In fact, economic policies can also affect cross-country variations in 
political and governance  quality. There is, in particular, some evidence that greater 
openness to trade and stronger competition are conducive to better governance
3. Given 
these conditions, economic policies may explain economic performances through their 
impact on political and governance institutions
4. To capture both effects, we estimate a 
simultaneous model of private investment and of political and governance institutions, 
where economic policies concurrently explain both variables.  
In this paper, we also investigate what types of political and governance 
institutions are more detrimental to entrepreneurs’ investment decisions. We introduce a 
large set of political and governance  variables which are not typically used in the 
literature. We classify political and governance  institutions in three categories: 
“Administrative Quality”, (QA), “Public Accountability” (PA), and “Political Stability” 
(PS). Since the initial indicators entering into these three categories are likely to be 
correlated, we process an aggregated indicator of political and governance institutions 
(GOV) using the principal component analysis methodology.  
Our empirical approach relies on panel data (cross section-time series analysis) 
which is suitable -- contrary to previous studies -- to jointly assessing the impact of 
economic policies and political and governance institutions on private investments: the 
time series dimension captures the variability of policies through time and the cross 
section dimension covers the political and governance variables which tend to evolve 
slowly. For this paper, we have also collected a new data set on private investment. We 
have extended and improved the data set of International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
which comprises private investments of various developing countries from 1970 to 1999. 
We have compared this data set with national and international sources especially when 
the data provided by country economists of the World Bank or by national sources differ 
considerably and added extra observations for more recent years. Finally, our data set 
covers 63 countries over the period 1970-2002 (see Annex A1 for the list of countries).  
                                                 
3 For the positive spillover from trade openness on institutions see Berg and Krueger (2003), Islam and 
Montenegro (2002), and Wei (2000). For the role of domestic competition, see Ades and Di Tella (1999), 
Djankov and others (2001), and the World Bank (2002).  
4 This impact might also be explained by the fact that the measure of institutional quality is most often 
subjective and an amalgam of policy and institutional factors.    4
Finally, the empirical model allows for the simultaneous estimation of private 
investments and of political and governance institutions.  This model is justified by the 
fact that -- in addition to economic policies -- changes in private investment can influence 
the quality of governance
5. Besides, this model of simultaneous equations allows other 
factors to affect private investment and the quality of political and governance institutions 
concurrently.  
Our estimations show that political and governance institutions are positively 
associated with investment’s decisions.  This finding confirms that the quality of the 
administration, the political stability and the public accountability are all significant in 
boosting private investment. Estimation results point out that one standard deviation 
improvement in aggregate index of governance leads to almost 2.5 percent increase in 
private investment to GDP ratio which constitutes a considerable improvement especially 
for developing countries. This result is robust to the introduction of other explanatory 
variables. Our estimations also confirm that the role of economic policies in the form of 
financial and trade policies are also highly detrimental for private investors to invest. Our 
results also uncover that, in addition to their direct impact, economic reforms affect 
private investment through their influence on institutional quality. 
In analyzing the contribution of factors to private investment in MENA, we 
compare performance of the MENA region in political and governance institutions with 
the ones of the more advanced developing economies of our sample, namely the East 
Asian economies. By means of the estimation results of the empirical model, we simulate 
which level of private investment MENA could have achieved if the region had 
experienced the same economic policies and political and governance institutions as East 
Asia throughout the 1980s and 1990s separately. Political Stability among other political 
and governance institutions appears to be most important factor in explaining the 
deficient private investment performance in the MENA in 1980s. In 1990s, the most 
important institutional factor turns out to be public accountability. A more precise 
diagnostic of the weaknesses of the political and governance institutions in MENA is also 
done by carefully calculating the contribution of each dimension of institutional variables 
                                                 
5 See Altmann (2006), Lipset (1959), Glaeser et al. (2004), Azariadis and Lahiri (2002), Alesina et. al. 
(1996), Isham et. al. (2002).  
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employed in the regressions. Our results show that the main shortcomings of the 1980s 
have come from the perception of religious tensions and external conflicts, as well as 
from the discontent of the population regarding their social economic situation. However, 
in 1990s political rights and civil liberties appear to be the most important factors in 
hindering private investment in the MENA region.  
This paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the political and 
governance institutions which are detrimental for entrepreneur to invest. The third section 
presents other determinants of private investment, in addition to political and governance 
institutions. The fourth section introduces the empirical model of private investment and 
political and governance institutions. The fifth section presents the estimations of the two 
equations. The sixth section calculates the contribution of political and governance 
institutions to the low level of private investment in MENA. The last section concludes.   
 
2. The role of Political and Governance Institutions in Private Investment 
Decisions  
The economic literature provides a number of classifications of political and 
governance institutions (see Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003 and the World Bank, 
2004). Our choice of indicators has however been limited by the lack of annual data 
available for a large sample of countries over a relatively long period of time. This paper 
proposes to group the political and governance  variables which are akin to affect 
individual investors’ decision into three categories: “Administrative Quality” (QA), 
“Public Accountability” (PA), and “Political Stability” (PS).  
 
  2.1. Quality of Administration (QA) 
The “Quality of Administration” expresses the ability of government to provide 
investors with an investment-friendly and reliable environment. The “Quality of 
Administration” is defined by four indicators from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG, 1999): (a) “Control over Corruption”, (b) “Quality of Bureaucracy”, (c) 
“Investment Profile”, and (d) “Law and Order” (see definitions of variables in Appendix   6
2). These institutions promote investments by reducing the costs and risks of doing 
business.  
  Corruption is often described as one of the major constraints facing enterprises in 
the developing world (see the World Bank 2005). For private investors, corruption raises 
the costs of investment and of operation. Corruption also increases uncertainties about the 
timing and effects of the application of government regulations. Besides, corruption 
augments the costs of public enterprises and in turn leads to insufficient and low quality 
infrastructure (see Tanzi and Davooli, 1997).  
The “Quality of Bureaucracy” describes the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies. The “Quality of Bureaucracy” indicates as well 
that “countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without 
drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk 
countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and 
to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training” (ICRG, 1999) 
6.  
  The “Investment Profile” measures the government’s attitude to inward 
investment. “Investment Profile” is defined by four indicators: a) risk to operations; b) 
taxation; c) profit repatriation; d) labor costs (ICRG, 1999). Because investors make long-
term decisions, risks to operations and other uncertainties about future policies are 
detrimental to investment decisions. Taxation and labor costs are also of first order 
importance for the costs and decisions to invest. Although government regulations and 
taxation are reasonable and warranted in order to protect the general public and to 
generate revenues to finance the delivery of public services and infrastructures, 
overregulation and over-taxation deter investments by raising business start-up and 
operating costs.  
Although many aspects of the business environment affect investment 
decisions, the security of property rights is one of the most important and the best 
documented. Because of the forward-looking nature of investment, investors need 
institutions that preserve the right of private property, ensure equitable and consistent rule 
of law in protecting this right, as well as effective incentives to respect and enforce it. A 
                                                 
6 See for example Evans and Rauch, (2000) for the effects of bureaucratic quality on the economic activity.   
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reliable judiciary, in particular, reduces transaction costs for businesses and sends 
positive signals to investors that rules of law will be equitably and consistently protected 
and enforced. The empirical literature, on the question of property rights and of rule of 
law is rather wide and the results of cross-country analysis are quite robust
7. In the “Law 
and Order” index, the law sub-component provides an “assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system”. The other sub-component concerns the “popular 
observance of the law” (ICRG, 1999).  
2.2. Public Accountability (PA) 
  “Public Accountability” consists in two indicators: “Civil Liberties” and 
“Political Rights”. These indicators are estimated by Freedom House (FH). 
Since fixed capital formation involves a certain degree of irreversibility, private 
investment decisions are sensitive to the perception of the credibility and tenacity of the 
political regime and of policies
8. A participatory political system provides stability of 
social institutions and ensures a public support to policies, which are in this case more 
sustainable in the long run. Public accountability is a guaranty of transparency and of 
better availability of information, which also help governments to build credibility. 
Public accountability provides access to policymakers and can hold them responsible for 
failures in implementing policies. In particular, freedom of press, free political parties 
and open elections contribute to government’s legitimacy and give voice to citizens in the 
decision-making process. The empirical validation of the effects of transparency and 
accountability on growth has, however, produced mitigated success
9. The work of Pastor 
and Sung (1995) is one of the few to show a positive effect of various indicators of 
democratic institutions on private investment in the developing world. 
 
  2.3. Political Stability (PS) 
  “Political Stability” includes the following variables from ICRG (1999): 
“Government Stability”, “Socioeconomic Conditions”, “Internal Conflict”, “External 
                                                 
7 See Calderon and Chong, (2000), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) in the context of growth; 
See North (1981), Knack and Keefer (1995), Easterly and Levine (2003), Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 
(2002), and Saleh (2004) in the context of investment. 
8 See in particular Rodrik (1991) and Serven and Solimano (1993).  
9 See De Haan and Siermann (1996), Prszeworski and Limongi (1993), Prszeworski et al. (2000).    8
Conflict”, “Ethnic Tensions”, “Religious Tensions”, and “Military in Politics” (see 
definition in Annex 2). Political instability increases the uncertainty in the economy and 
deters the risk-averse entrepreneurs to take action for profitable investment opportunities. 
Various authors have brought empirical evidence that various institutions associated with 
political instability hamper aggregate investment
10.  
All the political and governance indicators have been aggregated by employing 
principal component analysis (PCA) to account for the multi-collinearity issue in using 
these potentially correlated variables in the same regression equation. Results of PCA are 
given in Annex 3.  
 
3. Determinants of Private Investment, and of Political and Governance 
Institutions 
 
Developing countries do not operate in a competitive environment and face 
constraints that are not accounted for in the neoclassical model
11. In this paper, we 
address some of these constraints. After having controlled for the quality of governance 
and for the traditional determinants of private investment -- the expected aggregate 
demand (the accelerator) and the user cost of capital (Jorgenson, 1963) – we consider 
economic policy and human capital as part of the investment’s decisions. We also 
consider these factors as improving the quality of political and governance institutions.  
 
3.1. Structural Reforms 
Deficit in economic reforms is among the most common constraints faced by 
developing countries. Economic reforms, in particular, show a clear deficit in the MENA 
economies (Nabli and Véganzonès  -Varoudakis, 2006). Structural reforms are an 
important part of the actual and future profitability of private investment. In this paper, 
structural reforms are assessed through trade policy and financial development.  
                                                 
10 See in particular Rodrik (1991), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Le (2004), Brunetti and Weder (1994). In the 
growth context see also Alesina et al. (1996), Svensson (1998), Olson et al. (2000). 
11 See for example Greene and Villanueva (1991), Blejer and Khan (1984), and Serven (1997). See also 
Shafik (1992) on Egypt ; Schmidt and Muller (1992) on Morocco, as well as Bisat, El-Erian, El-Gamal and 
Mongelli (1996), and Aysan et. al. (2006) on MENA.   9
Financial development participates directly in private investment decisions. A 
developed financial system mobilizes and allocates resources to the enterprises. Besides, 
a developed financial system is expected to be more efficient through an increasing 
technological specialization, which leads to a better selection of projects and a more 
advanced diversification of risks. This allows the firms to finance more investment 
projects and increases the productivity of new investments (see Levine, 1997, for a 
synthesis). In addition, given the lack of well-functioning financial markets, the 
neoclassical assumption of the flexible accelerator model about the availability of credit 
supply by the banking sector cannot be taken for granted in developing countries. This 
discrepancy also occurs because of the public deficits and public debt, which can lead to 
financial repression and to eviction of private investment. The empirical literature 
provides now quite extensive evidence for the positive impact of financial development 
on private investment decisions
12.  
By increasing competitiveness and providing access to enlarged markets (Balassa, 
1978; Feder, 1982), trade reforms constitute another factor that stimulates private 
investment decisions. Trade openness as well is at the origin of economies of scale and of 
productivity gains. Besides, considering the general consensus on the role of tradable 
goods in providing positive externalities in the form of collateral for external financing 
(Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), trade openness influence the availability of 
external credit.  
All these factors create favorable conditions for the enterprises to invest. 
Economic reforms affect as well private investment through their impact on the quality of 
governance institutions. There is, in particular, considerable evidence that greater 
openness to trade and stronger competition lead to improved political and governance 
institutions
13. Opening up markets may help to weaken vested interests and reduce rents 
derived from prevailing economic and institutional arrangements. Trade openness may 
                                                 
12 In his survey of investment functions in developing countries, Rama (1993) presents the positive effect of 
financial development on private investment in 21 of the 31 papers surveyed. See also McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973). 
13 For the positive spillover from trade openness on governance quality, see Berg and Krueger (2003), 
Islam and Montenegro (2002) and Wei (2000). For the role of domestic competition, see Ades and Di Tella 
(1999), Djankov and others (2001), and the World Bank (2002).    10
also stimulate demands for governance institutions more suited to an increasingly varied 
and complex range of transactions (See IMF, 2003).  
 
3.2. Human Capital  
Human capital is a complementary factor of physical capital. Here, we assume 
health and education as part of the human capital index. Human capital stimulates private 
capital formation by raising the profitability of investment. Human capital can also be at 
the origin of positive externalities
14. Because skilled workers are better in dealing with 
changes, a skilled work force is essential for firms to adopt new and more productive 
technologies
15. Besides, new technologies generally require significant organizational 
changes, which are handled better by a skilled labor force
16. Human capital gives also the 
opportunity to the enterprises to expand or enter into new markets.  
  The literature highlights as well the importance of education in bringing better 
political and governance institutions (Lipset, 1959).  .  More educated people with higher 
life expectancy become more competent bureaucrats and -- in addition to better 
monitoring of the functioning of government officials -- demand for better quality of 
bureaucracy (Galor et al., 2005).  Besides, educational attainment reduces the political 
instability by generating more avenues to reconcile the opposing parties.  From the 
democratic accountability point of view, a more educated society is more likely to be 
enfranchised in terms of civil rights and liberties (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001).  These 
considerations justify why human capital also appears as an explanatory factor of private 
investment through its impact on the quality of political and governance institutions.  
  Although educational attainment has improved in the majority of developing 
countries, many firms still rate inadequate skills and education of workers as severe 
obstacles to their operations
17. This is the case of the MENA region as well, where 




                                                 
14 See Lucas (1988), Psacharopoulos (1988), and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).  
15 See in particular Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). 
16 See Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002).  
17 See the World Bank (2005). 
18 See Nabli and Véganzonès -Varoudakis (2006).    11
4. The Model of Private Investment and of Political and Governance 
Institutions  
 
Our empirical model aims at jointly explaining the share of private investment 
and the quality of political and governance institutions (Gov). The endogenous variables 
are simultaneously determined by influencing each other. In the private investment 
equation, lower quality of political and governance  institutions is expected to reduce 
private investment.  In the governance equation, private investment enters on the right 
side with an expected positive sign.  Other factors that affect both private investment and 
political and governance institutions are also taken into consideration.   
This system of equations is estimated using the three stage least squares 
estimation technique (3SLS) which allows to use the links between endogenous variables 
efficiently.  Since endogenous variables appear as regressors in other equations, they 
have to be instrumented out by using exclusion restrictions.  
The model estimated is the following: 
it i it it X Gov PI 1 1 2 1 0 ε α α α + + + =        (1) 
it i it it X PI Gov 2 2 2 1 0 ε β β γ + + + =      (2) 
Where 
it PI  is the share of private investment in GDP 
it Gov  represents the aggregate index of political and governance institutions 
i X1  and  i X 2  are the other control variables in private investment (PI) and 
governance (Gov) equations respectively 
it 1 ε  and  it 2 ε  are the error terms of each equations.  i indicates the country and t 
represents the time of the variable. 
In the neoclassical flexible accelerator model, the determinants of private 
investment include the expected aggregate demand (the accelerator) and the user cost of 
capital.  The private investment equation incorporates the real interest rate (Realr) and the 
GDP growth rate in last year (grow) to capture for the user cost of capital and the 
accelerator effect respectively.  These two variables are excluded from the governance 
equation (Gov) in order to identify the system.    12
Besides, the two equations include the GDP per capita, as well as the variations in 
structural reform (SR) and human capital (H).  Structural reforms consist of trade policy 
(TP) and financial development. Financial development is proxied by the private credit 
by banks and other depository institutions (Pcr). Trade policy is constructed by deducting 
the exports of oil and mining products, as well as the “natural trade openness” 
constructed by Frankel and Romer (1999) from the export and import in GDP ratio The 
structural reform indicator is generated by applying the principal component analysis to 
the trade policy and financial development variables (see results of PCA in Annex 3). 
Structural reform is expected to stimulate private investment and the institutional change 
for the better. The human capital indicator (H) consists of the life expectancy at birth, and 
the average years of primary, secondary and higher schooling in the total population over 
15 years old.  These variables are also aggregated using principal component analysis.  
Human capital is considered to enhance the private investment, as well as to lead to better 
political and governance institutions.  Human capital variable is expected to have positive 
coefficients in both of the equations.  
In the investment equation, GDP per capita accounts for the neoclassical Solow 
growth model. Countries with lower GDP per capita are expected to invest more over 
time and gradually catch up with more developed economies. Moreover, GDP per capita 
stands for possible externalities, such as greater market size on demand and supply of 
good and services. GDP per capita in governance equations represents the idea that more 
developed countries can afford to have better political and governance institutions 
(Azariadis and Lahiri 2002). A positive relationship is expected between GDP per capita 
and both private investment and political and governance institutions quality.  
The oil export as a percentage of total merchandise export stands for the natural 
curse hypothesis in the investment equation. When a country relies essentially on natural 
resources extraction, there can be less incentive to invest for other products. This result 
may stem from the increase in the cost of labor (Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999). Moreover, 
countries with less reliance on natural resources are expected to form better political and 
governance institutions. The natural resource-abounded countries do not need to mobilize 
the society to enhance aggregate income.  The ruling class can control the economy by 
collaborating with a small number of people in the society (Ross 2001, Bellin, 2001).     13
Under these circumstances, the elite is also less inclined to provide better governance by 
considering the future effects of today’s enfranchisements (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2001) and engage in more rent-seeking activities (Aysan, 2006).  The share of oil export 
in merchandise export is expected to reduce the quality of governance institutions. 
To identify the system of equations, we exclude the variable TenSyst (tenure of 
the system, (see Keefer et al., 2001) from the investment equation. TenSyst reports the 
number of years that an administrative system lasts in the country -- regardless of 
whether autocratic or democratic.  The underlying idea is that institutions settle over 
time. The longer the time passes with the existing system, the better institutions are 
established. This exclusion restriction is quite reasonable considering that TenSyst has a 
direct impact on the governance institutions whereas its influence on private investment 
is more likely to be realized through its effect on these institutions. Both of the equations 
include, finally, a regional dummy for the Middle Eastern and North African countries 
(MENA) to identify the position of the region among the other countries and to verify 
whether MENA substantially diverges from the rest of the world in terms of private 
investment, as well as of political and governance performance.   
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5. Estimating the Model of Private Investment and Political and Governance 
Institutions  
 
Table 1 reports the results of estimations. Equations (1) and (2) have been 
estimated on an unbalanced panel of 32 developing countries over 1980-2002 using the 
three stages least square estimations technique (3SLS). One of the most interesting 
outcomes of our estimations concerns the Governance indicator which positively explain 
investment’s decisions.  This finding confirms that the quality of the administration, the 
political stability and the public accountability – as defined in section 2 – have first order 
importance for the enterprises to invest. The aggregated governance indicator is 
characterized with 5 percent significance level. One standard deviation improvement in 
aggregate index of governance leads to almost 2.5 percent increase in private investment 
to GDP ratio which constitutes a considerable improvement especially for developing 
countries. This result makes a factual contribution to the empirical literature on political 
and governance institution by validating, over a relatively long period of time, the 
substantial role of a large set of political and governance variables on private economic 
performance.  
This result is robust to the introduction of other explanatory variables: structural 
reforms and human capital in particular. The roles of economic policy in explaining 
cross-country economic achievement has recently been questioned (Easterly and Levine; 
2003). Our estimations confirm however that, although the quality of governance 
constitutes a major factor in the private sector decisions, the role of economic policies 
cannot be disregarded.  Structural reform indicator emerges to be significant at 1 percent 
level with high coefficient value. Besides, our finding illustrates that firms in developing 
countries face constraints that are not accounted for in more developed economies and 
that deficiencies in trade policy, financial development and education have a long-term 
impact on private investment decisions and growth.  
Our estimations validate as well the neoclassical theory of the firm in the case of 
developing countries. The accelerator variable has the expected positive sign, which 
implies that anticipations of economic growth induce more investment. Similarly, the 
interest rate appears to exert a negative and highly significant effect on private   15
investment, which is consistent with the user cost of capital theory. These variables are 
highly significant even less than 1 percent level. Our finding indicates that supply and 
demand considerations are also part of private investment decisions in developing 
countries. Our estimations fail, however, to verify the Solow hypothesis of decreasing 
return to scale of physical capital accumulation.  The coefficient of the GDP per capita 
variable, although negative, is not significant.  
Estimation of equation (1) finally confirms the natural curse hypothesis. The 
coefficient of the oil export variable as a percentage of total merchandise export is 
significant and negative. Conversely, the regional dummy for MENA countries is not 
significant. This result shows that, after controlling for various explanatory factors, 
private investment in MENA do not diverge from the rest of the world.  
In the “Governance” equation (Table 1, column 2), our estimations reveal the 
positive impact of several factors on the quality of the political and governance 
institutions.  GDP per capita shows that more developed countries entail better political 
and governance institutions. Tenure of system also brings better political and 
administrative quality. Likewise, human capital improves political and governance 
institutions. This result also confirms that education and health of the population 
stimulate  private investment by also improving the governance quality.  
Our estimations fail, however, to validate the role of private investment in 
enhancing governance quality, neither of the negative impact of the share of oil export in 
merchandise export. This finding contradicts the opinion that countries with more 
reliance on natural resources form worse governance institutions. There is no evidence 
also that structural reforms improve governance quality. However, when estimating the 
system by eliminating private investment from equation (2), structural reforms appears 
this time to be positive and highly significant, while other results remain unchanged (see 
Table 1, column 4). This may stem from the correlation between structural reforms and 
private investment. Furthermore, our finding confirms that, in addition to the direct link 
highlighted previously, economic reforms affect private investment through their impact 
on institutional quality. As for human capital, this bidirectional causality brings novel 
empirical evidences on the link between institutions and private economic activity.    16
  An interesting result, finally, concerns the MENA dummy variable. Its coefficient 
is significant and negative. This finding confirms the deficit in political and governance 
institutions of the MENA region, as already mentioned (see the World Bank, 2004). After 
controlling the other determinants, MENA countries on average experience almost half 
point less aggregate index of political and governance institutions and this result is highly 
significant at less than 1 percent level. This result indicates the need for institutional 
reform in the MENA region, especially considering the positive and persistent role of 
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Table 1. Estimation Results 
Explanatory Endogenous  Endogenous 
Variables Variables  Variables 
  Priv Inv  GOV  Priv Inv  GOV 
  (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
GOV  2.25     2.29    
   (1.99)**     (2.02)**    
Private     0.029       
Investment     -1.01       
Structural  2.03     2.04    
Reforms         (8.79)***          (8.8)***    
      0.03     0.1 
      -0.45     (4.0***) 
Human  0.48     0.46    
Capital  (2.05)**     (1.97)**    
      0.07     0.09 
      (1.88)*     (3.16)*** 
Oil  -0.035     -0.037    
Exports         (2.97)***         (3.07)***    
      -0.0001     -0.0001 
      -0.08     -0.09 
GDP per  -0.0003     -0.0003    
Capita  -0.88     -0.88    
      0.0003     0.0003 
         (9.56)***        (10.04)*** 
MENA  0.026     0.07    
Dummy  -0.02     -0.07    
      -0.44     -0.49 
         (3.29)***        (3.78)*** 
Realr  -0.028    -0.035     
        (2.67)***          (3.28)***    
Growth  0.22     0.22    
         (3.68)***      (3.66)***    
Ten Syst     0.015     0.016 
         (6.03)***        (7.21)*** 
Constant  11.9 -0.91 11.9  -0.56 
          (16.74)***  (2.6***)         (16.77)***  (9.08***) 
Numb obs  349  349  349  349 
Notes: (*) indicates significance at 10 %; (**) indicates significance at 5 %; (***) indicates significance at 1 %. See sources 
of data in footnote 
Sources of data are as follows: the private investment series have been processed from various national and international 
sources (International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Development Indicators (WDI), Life Data Base (LDB), see section 
4.1 for more details). The “Administrative Quality” and “Political Stability” indexes use ICRG (1999) data. The 
components of the “Public Accountability” indicator come from Freedom House (2002). The “Structural Reforms” index 
uses data from WDI, but the oil export series entering the trade policy indicator comes from the United Nations. In the 
“Human Capital’ indicator, the numbers of years of schooling are from Barro and Lee (1994) and from Barro (2000a and 
b), and the life expectancy series is from WDI. All aggregated indicators have been generated after implementing the PCA 
methodology (see Annex 4 for more details). Interest rates (Rear) have been calculated from IFS and TenSyst comes from 
Keefer et al. (2001). All other data are from WDI.   18
6. How Much Deficiencies in Political and Governance Institutions Explain Low 
Private Investment in MENA?  
 
To assess the contribution of factors to private investment in MENA, we compare 
performance of the MENA region in “Administrative Quality”, “Political Stability” and 
“Public Accountability” – as well as in structural reforms and human capital -- to the 
ones of the more advanced developing economies of our sample, namely the East Asian 
economies. Using the model estimated previously, we simulate which level of private 
investment MENA could have achieved if the region had experienced the same economic 
policies and political and governance institutions as East Asia. This comparison has been 
done for two time periods – the 1980s and the 1990s respectively – which reveal quite 
different characteristics.  
 
Table 2: Private Investment to GDP 















               QA PA PS       
1980 11.9  1.78 0.6 3.09     5.47 17.37 
              0.7 0.67  1.72      
1990 11.6  4.2 0.2  1.16     5.56 17.16 
              0.18 0.67 0.31      
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
We first calculate the coefficients of the initial variables entering into the 
composite governance indicator. The calculation is based on the estimated coefficients of 
the aggregate indicator in the regression (Gov, Table 1 column 3), as well as on the 
weights of each principal component in the aggregate indicator combined with the 
loading of the initial variables in each principal component (Annex 3)
19. Coefficients of 
the initial variables are presented in Annex 4 and contributions appear in Tables 2 and 3. 
The contribution of the Administration Quality has been calculated by aggregating the 
                                                 
19 See for example, Nagaraj et al (2000) for more details on the methodology.    19
contributions of its four sub-components




23 and Human Capital
24 as well.  
A first set of conclusions concerns the weaknesses of MENA institutions during 
the 1980s (see Table 2). Insufficient “Administrative Quality” compared to East Asia has 
cost to the region 0.7 percent of private investment to GDP on average per year. The cost 
of deficiencies in “Political Stability” has even been higher (1.72 per cent of GDP). 
Private investment could have reached on average 14.29 per cent of GDP (compared to 
11.9 percent observed) if MENA had benefited from the same quality of administration 
and political stability as East Asia.  
In the 1990s, the gap with East Asia was noticeably reduced. Progress in 
“Administrative Quality” (0.18) and “Political Stability” (0.67) helped investment’s 
decisions, which deficit has only been of 0.85  points of GDP on average per year (see 
Table 2). Other studies acknowledge this progress in the quality of the administration 
during the late 1990s (see in particular the World Bank, 2004)
25. “Public Accountability”, 
however, did not improve throughout the 1990s. With an identical “Public 
Accountability` level as in East Asia, MENA region could have increased private 
investment by 0.67 percent of GDP on average per year on each decade.  
Institutional deficiencies have not been the only reason of the low private 
investment performances in MENA region. Deficit in structural reforms constitutes 
another major explanatory factor over the whole period, but more importantly during the 
1990s. The low trade openness of the region compared to East Asia and the insufficient 
development of the financial system have reduced private sector investment projects by 
4.2 points of GDP in average per year (1.78 during the 1980s). The ratio of private 
investment could have reached 16.96 percent of GDP during the 1990s (compared to 11.6 
                                                 
20 Theses sub-components are corruption, bureaucracy quality, investment friendly profile of administration 
and law and order (see section 2).. 
21 Political Stability has been proxied by aggregating the following indicators: government stability, social 
economic conditions, military in politics, internal and external conflicts, religious and ethnic tensions.  
22 Public Accountability has been calculated by using civil liberties and political rights.  
23 The Structural Reform indicator contains trade policy and financial development 
24 Human Capital is defined from life expectancy, and years of primary, secondary and tertiary education 
25 The same studies note, however, that the smaller gap with East Asia is also partly due to a less significant 
improvement in the quality of institutions in this region.    20
observed) and 16.77 percent in the 1980s, if both factors (structural reforms and 
governance) had been improved to a similar level as in East Asia (see Table 2). 
Interesting conclusions emerge also in analyzing a more precise diagnostic of the 
weaknesses of the political and governance institutions in MENA. In the 1980s, 
weaknesses involve the four sub components of “Quality of Administration”: corruption 
is one important aspect, but the quality of the bureaucracy and of the judiciary system, as 
well as limitations dues to risks to operations, regulations, taxations, and cost of labor are 
also salient (see Table 3). Our findings are in line with the conclusions of the literature on 
the role of corruption, as well as of rules of law and property rights in reducing the costs 
and risks of doing business. Besides, our results unravel new empirical evidences on the 
subject of regulation and taxation and on their impact on the business environment.  
 
Table 3: Private Investment to GDP 
How much Private Investment Increases with Improvement in:  
          
PI/GDP    corrup bur  inves law    pol civ 
percent  QA  tion qual prof ord  PA  rights lib 
            
1980s  0.7  0.19 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.67  0.31 0.36 
            
1990s  0.18  0.01  0.15 0 0.02  0.67  0.32 0.35 
            
PI/GDP    gov soc  int  ext ethn  relig  milit 
percent  PS  stab 
eco. 
cond confl confl tens  pol  pol 
           
1980s  1.72  0  0.45 0.25 0.45 -0.11 0.48  0.2 
           
1990s  0.31  -0.02 0.15 0.02 0.05 -0.13 0.31 -0.07 
PI/GDP    priv  trade       
percent  SR  cred  pol                 
           
1980s  1.78  0.48  1.3                 
           
1990s  4.2  2   2 . 2                  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
On “Political Stability”, the main shortcomings of the 1980s have come from the 
perception of religious tensions and external conflicts, as well as from the discontent of   21
the population regarding their social economic situation (0.48 0.45 to 0.45 points of GDP 
respectively depending on the factors, see Table 3). This finding confirms that institutions 
associated with political instability have a disruptive effect on aggregate investment. 
Finally, on “Public Accountability”, concerns about civil liberties and political rights 
explain in the same way the deficiencies in private investment. After all, this section also 
contributes to the literature by identifying which specific factors are more costly for 
private investment decisions in MENA countries. For example, in 1990s political rights 
and civil liberties appear to be the most important factors in hindering private investment.  
Another striking feature relates to the critical concern about trade policy and 
financial development. In MENA, trade policy deficiencies have reduced private 
investment decisions by respectively 1.3 and 2.2 per cent of GDP on average per year 
during the two decades. Likewise, a better financial system (such as in the East Asian 
economies) would have stimulated firms’ decisions to invest by 4.8 points of GDP yearly 
during the 1990s (see Table 3). This result makes of structural reforms another important 
question that MENA governments have to address if the region wants to catch up with 
more successful developing economies.  
 
7. Conclusion  
The main conclusion of this paper is that political and governance institutions 
matter for private investment decisions. This result has been empirically shown by 
estimating a model of private investment and political and governance quality for a panel 
of 32 developing countries over the 1980s and the 1990s.  Our estimations verify  that a 
low level of corruption, a good quality of bureaucracy, a reliable judiciary, a strong 
security of property rights, a reasonable risk to operations, as well as a sound taxation and 
regulation contribute significantly to the firms’ decision to invest.  Our estimations also 
corroborate that “Political Stability” and “Public Accountability”, by providing a sound 
and predictable environment to the enterprises, participate in a friendly business 
environment. These results add significantly to the literature on governance by validating 
the role of a large set of institutional variables on private economic performances over a 
relatively long period of time.    22
  Our findings are robust to the introduction of other explanatory variables: 
structural reforms -- in the form of trade openness and financial development -- and 
human capital in particular. We are therefore able to confirm that -- contrary to recent 
works which approach political and governance institutions as the dominant factors with 
little independent influence of economic policies (see Rodrick, Subramanina, and Trebbi, 
2002; and Easterly and Levine, 2003). -- economic policies and political and governance 
institutions both participate in the firms’ decisions to invest. Besides, our finding 
illustrate that firms in developing countries face constraints that are not accounted for in 
more developed economies.  
  In MENA, political and governance deficiencies greatly explain the low private 
investment performances of the region during the 1980s. Deficit in “Quality of 
Administration” and “Public Accountability” compared to East Asia has cost on average 
per year 1.37 point of private investment to GDP. The “Political Instability” of the period 
has deterred investment decisions even more, with a deficit in private investment of 1.72 
percent of GDP.  
In the 1990s, the gap with East Asia was noticeably reduced. Progress in 
“Administrative Quality” and “Political Stability” helped investment’s decisions. “Public 
Accountability”, however, did not improve throughout the 1990s. In MENA countries, 
deficient political rights and civil liberties have led to 0.67 less private investment to 
GDP ratio per year throughout 1990s. This result shows that improvement in democratic 
institutions is still a key issue in the region.  
 Institutional deficiencies, however, have not been the only reason of the MENA 
low private investment. Deficit in structural reforms constitutes another major 
explanatory factor, over the whole period, but more importantly during the 1990s. These 
deficiencies have cost 4.2 points of GDP in terms of private investment in the 1990s. This 
makes of structural reforms an important question that MENA governments have also to 
address in order for the region to catch up with more successful developing economies.    23
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Annex 1  
 
Table A1.  
 













Colombia* Papua  New  Guinea* 
Comoros Paraguay* 
Costa Rica*  Peru* 
Cote d'Ivoire  Philippines* 
Croatia Poland* 
Dominican Rep.  Romania 
Ecuador*  Serbia and Montenegro 
Egypt, Arab Rep.* Seychelles 
El Salvador  South Africa* 
Estonia St  Lucia 
Ethiopia St.  Lucia 
Guatemala*  St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Guinea-Bissau Thailand* 
Guyana Trinidad  &  Tobago* 




Iran, Islamic Rep. Venezuela* 
 Yugoslavia  (FR) 
 Due to the lack of corresponding data for some countries, only counties marked 
with an * are included in the final regressions   30
Annex 2 
Definition of the Political and governance Indicators  
 
  Quality of Administration (QA) 
  The Quality of Administration index is composed of four indicators from ICRG 
defined in the following manner: 
(i) Control over Corruption “is a measure of corruption within the political 
system.  Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it 
distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of 
government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power 
through patronage rather than ability, and, last but not least, introduces an 
inherent instability into the political process”. 
(ii) Quality of Bureaucracy indicates that “countries where the bureaucracy has 
the strength and expertise govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services.  In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy 
tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an 
established mechanism for recruitment and training.  Countries that lack the 
cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in 
government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day 
administrative functions.” 
  (iii) Investment Profile “is a measure of the government’s attitude to inward 
  investment as determined by an assessment of four sub-components: the risk to 
  operations, taxation and repatriation and labor costs”.   31
  (iv) Law and Order “are assessed separately.  The Law sub-component is an 
  assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order 
  sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.”   
 
Public Accountability (PA) 
The second set of candidates measures the “Public Accountability”.  This index 
includes two indicators from Freedom House (FH): “Civil Liberties” and “Political 
Rights”. 
 
The “Civil Liberties” index mainly addresses the following questions:  
-  Are there free and independent media, literature and other forms of cultural 
expressions? 
-  Is there open public discussion and free private discussion? 
-  Is there freedom of assembly and demonstration? 
-  Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? 
-  Are citizens equal under the law, do they have access to an independent and 
nondiscriminatory judiciary, and are they respected by the security forces? 
-  Is there protection from unjustified imprisonment, exile or torture whether by 
groups that support or oppose the regime? 
-  Is there freedom from war or insurgency situations? 
-  Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalent, and is 
there effective collective bargaining? 
-  Are there free professional and other private organizations?   32
-  Are there free businesses or cooperatives? 
-  Are there free religious institutions, and free private and public religious 
expression? 
-  Are there personal social freedom, which includes aspects such as gender 
equality, property rights, freedom of movements, choice of residence, and 
choice of marriage and size of family? 
-  It there equality of opportunity –which include freedom from exploitation by 
or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats,  or any 
other type of denigrating obstacle – to a share of legitimate economic gains? 
-  Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption? 
 
The “Political Rights” index addresses the following questions:  
-  Is the head of the state, head of government, or other chief authority elected 
through free and fair elections? 
-  Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
-  Are there faire electoral laws? 
-  Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real 
power? 
-  Do the people have the right to freely organize in different political parties or 
other competitive political groping of their choice, and is the system open to 
the rise and fall of those competing parties or groupings?   33
-  Are there a significant opposition vote, a de facto opposition power, and a 
realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power 
through elections?  
-  Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, 
totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other 
powerful groups? 
-  Do cultural ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-
determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal 
consensus in the decision making process? 
-  For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the 
system provide for consultation with the people encourage discussion of 
policy, and allow the right to petitions the rules? 
 
 Political  Stability  (PS) 
  The political stability index includes the following variables from ICRG:  
Government Stability “is a measure both of the government’s ability to carry out 
its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office.  This will depend on the 
type of governance, the cohesion of the government and governing party or 
parties, the closeness of the next election, the government’s command of the 
legislature, popular approval of government policies, and so on.” 
Socioeconomic conditions “is an attempt to measure general public satisfaction, 
or dissatisfaction, with the government’s economic policies.  In general terms, the 
greater the popular dissatisfaction with a government’s policies, the greater the   34
chances that the government will be forced to change tack, possibly to the 
detriment of business, or will fall.”  
Internal Conflict “is an assessment of political violence in the country and its 
actual or potential impact on governance.  The highest rating is given to those 
countries where there is no armed opposition to the government and the 
government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its 
own people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil 
war.” 
External Conflict “is an assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government 
and to inward investment.   It ranges from trade restrictions and embargoes, 
whether imposed by a single country, a group of countries, or the international 
community as a whole, through geopolitical disputes, armed threats, exchanges of 
fire on borders, border incursions, foreign-supported insurgency, and full-scale 
warfare.” 
Ethnic Tensions “measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to 
racial, nationality, or language divisions.  Lower ratings are given to countries 
where racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are 
intolerant and unwilling to compromise.   Higher ratings are given to countries 
where tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist.” 
Religious Tensions “may stem from the domination of society and/or governance 
by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to 
exclude other religions from the political and/or social process; the desire of a 
single religious group to dominate governance; the suppression off religious 
freedom; the desire of a religious group to express its own identity, separate from 
the country as a whole.”   35
Military in Politics: “The military is not elected by anyone.   Therefore, its 
involvement in politics, even at a peripheral level, is a diminution of democratic 
accountability.   However, it also has other significant implications.  The military 
might, for example, become involved in government because of an actual or 
created internal or external threat.  Such a situation would imply the distortion of 
government policy in order to meet this threat, for example by increasing the 
defense budget at the expense of other budget allocations.”   36
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Principal Component Analysis 




P1 4.73 0.36 
P2 1.72 0.5 
P3 1.32 0.6 
P4 1.1 0.68 
P5 0.76 0.74 
P6 0.7 0.8 
P7 0.66 0.85 
P8 0.53 0.89 
P9 0.45 0.92 
P10 0.39 0.95 
P11 0.26 0.97 
P12 0.24 0.99 




Table A3.2: The Governance Indicator Loadings 
Loadings  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
Corruption  0.25 0.18 0.49 0.02 0.19 0.06 0.27 
Bureaucracy Qual  0.28  0.2  0.27 0.38 0.17 0.08  0 
Investment profile  0.29 0.04 0.39 0.38 0.31 0.01 0.25 
Law and Order  0.34 0.28 0.02 0.14 0.27  0.1  0.08 
Political Rights  0.23  0.59 0.1  0.2 0.09 0.1 0.04 
Civil Liberties  0.23 0.59 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.07 
Government Stab  0.25 0.14 0.58 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.31 
Socio Eco Cond  0.22 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.69 0.16 0.29 
Internal Conflicts   0.37 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.06 0.07 0.24 
External Conflicts   0.29 0.12 0.21 0.22 0.04 0.53 0.53 
Ethnic Tensions  0.27 0.01 0.05 0.38 0.04 0.74 0.09 
Religious Tensions  0.21 0.18 0.09 0.52 0.45 0.22 0.53 
Military in Politics  0.32 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.22 0.23 0.17 
Loadings  P8  P9  P10 P11 P12 P13    
Corruption  0.41 0.48 0.38 0.04 0.09 0.03   
Bureaucracy Qual  0.33 0.67 0.24 0.08  0.1  0.02   
Investment profile  0.02 0.02 0.23 0.46 0.44 0.08   
Law and Order  0.06 0.27 0.56 0.52 0.19 0.05   
Political Rights  0.02 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.05  0.7   
Civil Liberties  0.03 0.13 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.71   
Government Stab  0.15  0.1  0  0.43 0.45 0.06     37
Socio Eco Cond  0.11 0.16 0.04 0.17  0.3  0.01   
Internal Conflicts   0.21 0.14 0.17  0.5  0.6  0.01   
External Conflicts   0.29  0.08 0.3 0.17 0.2 0.02   
Ethnic Tensions  0.07  0.3  0.34 0.05 0.04 0.01   
Religious Tensions  0.09 0.17 0.26 0.01 0.06 0.02   
Military in Politics  0.73 0.18 0.31 0.03 0.21 0.05    




Table A3.3: The Structural Reform 
Indicator (SR = P1) 
Component Eigenvalue  Cumulative 
R2  
P1  1.49  0.75 
P2  0.59  1 
 
Table A3.4: The Structural Reform 
Indicator Loadings 
Loadings P1  P2 
Trade Policy  0.71 0.71 
Private 
Credit  71 -0.71 
 
 
Table A3.5: The Human Capital 
Indicator (H = P1)  
Component Eigenvalue  Cumulative 
R2  
P1 3.14 0.78 
P2 0.38 0.88 
P3 0.31 0.96 
P4 0.18  1 
 
Table A3.6: The Human Capital Indicator Loadings 
Loadings  P1 P2 P3 P4 
Life 
Expectancy  0.52 -0.33 0.03 -0.79 
H1  0.5 -0.41  0.55 0.53 
H2  0.5 -0.05 -0.8 0.32 
H3  0.48 0.85 0.23 -0.03 
   38
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A4.1: Short-Term Coefficients of the Disaggregated 
Indicators 
Short Term Elasticities 
Standardized Level 












  law and order 
0.17 
0.13 
  political rights  0.56  0.28 
  civil liberties  0.56  0.35 
  government stability   0.06  0.02 
 
socioeconomic 
conditions*  0.41 
0.23 
  internal conflict   0.24  0.1 
  external conflict  0.25  0.11 
  ethnic tensions   0.19  0.13 
  religious tensions   0.28  0.2 
  military in politics  0.39  0.24 
           
TradeP  1.44 0.05  SR 
PCrBOG  1.44 0.07 
           
H  life  0.25 0.02 
  H1  0.24 0.15 
  H2  0.24 0.32 
   H3  0.23 1.84 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: (1) Impact is calculated using the estimated coefficient of the 
aggregated indicators (GOV, SR and H, see equation (3), Table (1)), as 
well as the weights of each principal component in the aggregate 
indicators, combined with the loading of the initial variables in each 
principal component (see Annex 3).  
 
 